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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
ATTORNEYS-UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE--CLAIMS DEPARTMENTS OF CASU-
ALTY INSURANCE COPANIES-[EMssouri].-A special Missouri court1 re-
cently held that casualty insurance companies were engaged in the unlawful
practice of law by reason of legal services performed by managers and
employees in claims departments, notwithstanding the fact that one or more
licensed attorneys were regularly employed in such departments. 2 The acts
held to constitute unlawful law practice were the adjustment and settle-
ment of claims, the preparation of releases and covenants not to sue, the
giving of advice to the companies and the insured of their legal rights, the
appearance before the Workmen's Compensation Commission, and the deter-
mination of the legal liability of the companies. The mere discovery of
witnesses, the appraisement of damage to property in cases of undisputed
liability, the ministerial execution of prepared instruments, and the payment
in discharge of claims were acts held not to constitute unlawful practice
of the law.
The field of law relative to unauthorized practice is a troublesome one
and has assumed considerable importance in recent years.8 It is well settled
that neither corporations nor laymen may practice law. 4 The difficulty
arises when an attempt is made to draw the line between what is law
practice and what is not. It is universally conceded that trial work,
1. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. et al. v. Clark (Boone Cty. Cct. Ct., Mo.
1938) 5 U. S. Law Week 643. Two additional judges heard the case as
advisory judges by agreement of the parties.
2. For general treatment of this subject see 111 A. L. R. 19; Ann. Cas.
1918 C 131; 7 C. J. S., Attorney and Client (1937) 704, sec. 3; 5 Am. Jur.,
Attorneys at Law (1936) 262, sec. 3. The cases are collected and arranged in
Brand, Unauthorized Praetice Decisions (1937).
3. Cattarall, The Unauthorized Practice of the Law (1933) 19 A. B. A. J.
652; Gleason, Unauthorized Practice of the Law (1935) 21 A. B. A. J. 243.
4. For annotations on this point as to corporations see 73 A. L. R. 1327
and 105 A. L. R. 1364; People ex rel. Lawyers Institute of San Diego v.
Merchants' Protective Ass'n (1922) 189 Cal. 351, 209 Pac. 363; State ex
rel. Boynton v. Perkins (1934) "138 Kan. 899, 28 P. (2d) 765; State ex rel.
Miller v. St. Louis Union Trust Co. (1934) 335 Mo. 845, 74 S. W. (2d) 348(leading case in Missouri); The Bar Association of St. Louis v. H. Pagels
d. b. a. Mutual Adjustment Co. (St. Louis Cct. Ct., Mo. 1935) No. 2632-C,
Div. No. 2 (layman who solicited claims and threatened suit as a collection
firm held engaged in unlawful practice of law); Van Hee v. Kauffman (St.
Louis Cct. Ct., Mo. 1935) No. 211420, Div. No. 3; State ex rel. Lundin v.
Merchants' Protective Corp. (1919) 105 Wash. 12, 177 Pac. 694. In the
leading case of In re Cooperative Law Co. (1910) 198 N. Y. 479, 92 N. E.
15, the court said: "The relation of attorney and client is that of master
and servant in a limited and dignified sense, and it involves the highest
trust and confidence. It cannot be delegated without consent, and it cannot
exist between an attorney employed by a corporation to practice law for it,
and a client of the corporation, for he would be subject to the directions of
the corporation, and not to the directions of the client."
5. Cobb v. Judge of Superior Court of Grand Rapids (1880) 43 Mich.
289, 5 N. W. 309; Kaplan v. Berman (1902) 75 N. Y. S. 1002.
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preparation of briefs,6 and the rendition of legal advice to clients7 are
acts which constitute law practice. It is equally well settled that the prac-
tice of the law is not limited to the performance of these acts.8 The recent
tendency of the courts has been to curtail the activities of laymen 9 and to
include within the term "law practice" the preparation of all legal docu-
ments, at least where the determination of a legal mind is involved. 10
Thus the preparation of wills,11 trust agreements, 12 bills of sale and
chattel mortgages' s have been held to constitute the practice of law. How-
ever, in isolated instances or in instances where there is no holding out of
such services, the preparation of legal documents has been held not to
constitute law practice. Thus it has been held that a real estate broker may
draw a deed of conveyance necessary to the transaction of a brokerage
business, 14 though in a similar situation a contrary result has been reached.'
5
A recent Pennsylvania case has held the preparation and filing of plead-
ings before a Workmen's Compensation Commission to be of too simple a
nature to constitute law practice.' 6 But the distinction between simple and
complex instruments has been rejected by some courts.'7
A corporation cannot practice law because it is not subject to the control
exercised by the court over the bar.18 It has therefore been held that a
corporation cannot perform services for the incorporation of other firms.' 9
For the same reason assessment and condemnation services contemplating
appearance before a judicial body,2 0 the foreclosure of a mortgage, 21 the
6. In re Bailey (1915) 50 Mont. 365, 146 Pac. 1101, Ann Cas. 1917B
1198; Bank v. Risley (1844) 6 Hill (N. Y.) 375.
7. People ex rel. Colorado Bar Ass'n v. Erbaugh (1908) 42 Colo. 480,
94 Pac. 349; Fichette v. Taylor (1934) 191 Minn. 582, 254 N. W. 910, 94
A. L. R. 356.
8. Clark v. Austin (Mo. 1937) 101 S. W. (2d) 977; Eley v. Miller (1893)
7 Ind. App. 529, 534, 34 N. E. 836, 837.
9. Decisions Defining Practice of Law (1938) 5 U. S. Law Week 648.
10. In re Eastern Idaho Loan and Trust Co. (1930) 49 Idaho 280, 288
Pac. 157, 73 A. L. R. 1323; Crawford v. McConnell (1935) 173 Old. 520,
49 P. (2d) 551; Paul v. Stanley (1932) 168 Wash. 371, 12 P. (2d) 401,
where it is said that one giving legal advice to those for whom he draws
instruments does work of a legal nature "when such instruments set forth,
limit, terminate, claim or grant legal rights."
11. People v. People's Trust Co. (1917) 167 N. Y. S. 767.
12. Ibid.; In re Eastern Idaho Loan and Trust Co. (1930) 49 Idaho 280,
288 Pac. 157, 73 A. L. R. 1323.
13. People v. Title Guaranty and Trust Co. (1917) 168 N. Y. S. 278.
This decision is criticized in a Note (1918) 31 Harv. L. Rev. 886, on the
broad ground that it tends to hamper economic development.
14. Childs v. Smeltzer (1934) 315 Pa. 9, 171 Atl. 883.
15. In re Gore (Ohio App. 1937) 5 U. S. Law Week 569.
16. Shortz v. Farrell (Pa. 1937) 193 At. 20. See also Cain v. Merchants'
Nat. Bank and Trust Co. (1936) 66 N. D. 746, 268 N. W. 719.
17. Re S. E. Matthews (Idaho 1936) 62 P. (2d) 578, 111 A. L. R. 13;
People v. People's Trust Co. (1917) 167 N. Y. S. 767; Paul v. Stanley
(1932) 168 Wash. 371, 12 P. (2d) 401.
18. In re Opinion of the Justices (1935) 289 Mass. 607, 194 N. E. 313.
19. In re Pace (1915) 156 N. Y. S. 641. On this point see 73 A. L. R.
1335.
20. For collection of cases see 73 A. L. R. 1333.
21. Re Otterness (1930) 181 Minn. 254, 232 N. W. 318, 73 A. L. R. 1319.
1938]
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enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy proceedings, 22 and pro-
ceedings in matters of estate and guardianship23 have been held to con-
stitute the practice of the law. Similarly, though the collection of claims
without resort to courts of law does not constitute the practice of law,24
it does constitute law practice where the collector undertakes to give legal
advice, threaten debtors with legal proceedings, or represent the employer in
court either directly or through an attorney engaged for him.25 But merely
paying the expenses of a particular litigation or retaining an attorney on
an annual salary basis to attend to the legal business of the corporation
is not practice of the law. 26
The growth of administrative tribunals has presented a problem in the
unauthorized practice field. Appearance before a tax board was held to
constitute practice of the law, 27 but four years later a contrary result was
reached in the same jurisdiction.28 In line with the latter case, the prepara-
tion and argument of appeals before a Board of Standards and Appeals
was held not to constitute law practice.29 But in recent cases the handling
and adjusting of claims by a layman before the Workmen's Compensation
Commission has been held to be unlawful practice of the law. 0 The same
result has been reached where appearance before a Public Service Com-
mission was involved. 3' From recent holdings it would seem that adjust-
ment and settlement of claims by corporations or laymen, whether before
an administrative tribunal or not, constitutes law practice whenever the
determination of legal rights and liabilities is involved.32
22. Meisel and Co. v. National Jewelers' Board of Trade (1915) 152
N. Y. S. 913.
23. Re Otterness (1930) 181 Minn. 254, 232 N. W. 318, 73 A. L. R. 1319.
24. For general collection of authorities see annotation in 84 A. L. R. 750.
25. Berk v. State ex rel. Thompson (1932) 225 Ala. 324, 142 So. 832,
84 A. L. R. 740; Creditors' Nat. Clearing House v. Baumwart (1917) 227
Mass. 579, 116 N. E. 886, Ann. Cas. 1918C 130; Bar Association of St.
Louis v. National Alliance Corp. (St. Louis Cct. Ct., Mo. 1936) 2 Unauthor-
ized Practice News (March, 1936) 34, where order to cease and desist was
made upon finding that the corporation solicited claims and attempted to
force settlements by threat of legal proceedings; Missouri ex inf. Mc-
Kittrick, Attorney General, v. C. S. Dudley and Co., Inc. (Mo. 1937) 102
S. W. (2d) 895 (leading case in Missouri); Re Cooperative Law Co. (1910)
198 N. Y. 479, 92 N. E. 15. Cf. Dietzel v. State (Tex. Crim. App. 1936)
98 S. W. (2d) 183.
26. Re Otterness (1930) 181 Minn. 254, 232 N. W. 318, 73 A. L. R. 1319.
27. People ex rel. Trojan Realty Co. v. Purdy (1916) 162 N. Y. S. 56.
28. Tannenbaum v. Higgins (1920) 180 N. Y. S. 738.
29. Croker Nat. Fire Prevention Eng. Co. v. Harlem French Cleaning
and Dyeing Works (1927) 230 N. Y. S. 670.
30. People of the State of Ill. ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Goodman
(1937) 366 Ill. 346, 8 N. E. (2d) 941, 111 A. L. R. 1. See also Clark v.
Austin (Mo. 1937) 101 S. W. (2d) 977.
31. Clark v. Austin (Mo. 1937) 101 S. W. (2d) 977.
32. Meunier v. Bernich (La. App. 1936) 170 So. 567 (leading case on
claim adjusters); Hightower v. Detroit Edison Co. (1933) 262 Mich. 1, 247
N. W. 97, 86 A. L. R. 509; State Bar of Missouri v. Universal Adjustment
and Inspection Co. (Mo. 1935) 2 Unauthorized Practice News (Sept. 1936)
101, where ouster order was issued against corporation which threatened
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In order to determine whether particular acts fall within the scope of
law practice, courts 33 and legislatures 34 have formulated definitions os-
tensibly for the guidance of those concerned with the problem. Such defini-
tions are far too broad to be dependable. It has been suggested that the
need is for a definition of law practice which will cover the field of activities
that are exclusively legal without attempting to take in others which are
properly legal, but also legitimate for other vocations.35
It would seem that the actual holdings of the cases must be considered
carefully with respect to the particular facts involved. Upon such an
analysis it is clear that the overwhelming tendency is to extend the defini-
tion of law practice for reasons of public policy. The instant case follows
the general trend of decisions, though the wisdom of the policy is yet a
matter of controversy. 8  A.B. H.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-TAXATION-IMMUNITY OF STATE AGENCY FOm
FEDERAL TAXATION-[United States].-The difficulty which governmental
bodies have experienced in finding suitable revenue sources has naturally
given rise to a tendency to limit the immunity of governmental agencies
from taxation. The doctrine of Collector v. Day' was again limited by the
United States Supreme Court in two recent decisions. In Helvering v.
Mountain Producer Corporation2 and Helvering v. Barline Oil Co. 3 the
legal proceedings in order to force settlement of solicited claims; The Bar
Ass'n of St. Louis v. International Ass'n of Commerce, Inc. (St. Louis Cct.
Ct., Mo. 1937) No. 6013, Div. No. 3.
33. A definition of law practice often quoted is that pronounced in Eley
v. Miller (1893) 7 Ind. App. 529, 34 N. E. 836: "As the term is generally
understood, the practice of the law is the doing or performing services in
a court of justice * * * But in a larger sense it includes legal advice and
counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which
legal rights are secured." See also Clark v. Austin (Mo. 1937) 101 S. W.
(2d) 977, and Paul v. Stanley (1932) 168 Wash. 371, 12 P. (2d) 401.
34. In Missouri the "law business" is "the advising or counselling, for a
valuable consideration, of any person, firm, association, or corporation as
to any secular law or the drawing or procuring of or assisting in the draw-
ing for a valuable consideration in a representative capacity, obtaining, or
tending to obtain or securing or tending to secure for any person, firm,
association or corporation any property or property rights whatsoever."
(R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 11692). In State ex rel. Miller v. St. Louis Union
Trust Co. (1934) 335 Mo. 845, 74 S. W. (2d) 348, the mere naming of
the corporation as executor, where no charge was made for drawing the
will, was held a valuable consideration within the meaning of the statute.
35. Ashley, Unauthorized Practice of the Law (1930) 16 A. B. A. J. 558.
36. For an excellent discussion of the present and potential evils of un-
lawful practice of the law see Swaffield, Unlawful Practice of the Law:
The Profession's Responsibility in Relation Thereto (1932) 5 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 181. See also supra, notes 3 and 35. See dissenting opinion in Liberty
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Clark (Boone Cty. Cct. Ct., Mo. 1938) 5 U. S. Law
Week 643.
1. (1871) 78 U. S. 113, 20 L. ed. 122.
2. (1938) 5 U. S. Law Week 8.
3. Id. at 11.
19381
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol23/iss3/13
